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THE FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA'S POWER TO
TERMINATE PROPERLY INSTITUTED
CLASS ACTIONS©
BY VINCE MORABITO*
The regime governing class actions in the Federal
Court of Australia is unique, by international standards,
as it does not require the formal authorisation of the
Court before a proceeding may be brought and
conducted as a class action. A class action may be
commenced in the Federal Court as long as certain
prerequisites are satisfied. Another unique aspect of this
regime is that wide powers have been conferred upon the
Court to terminate, as class actions, proceedings that
have complied with the requirements for commencing a
class action. It is the aim of this article to explore the
conceptual and practical issues raised by the availability
and exercise of these powers to discontinue properly
commenced class actions. As part of this evaluation, the
Canadian and United States class action regimes are
extensively canvassed.
Selon les normes internationales, le regime
rdgissant les actions de groupe A la Cour f~drale
d'Australie est unique en son genre en ce sens qu'il
permet d'introduire et d'intenter une action en justice en
qualit6 d'action de groupe sans autorisation officielle de
cette Cour. II est permis d'introduire une action de
groupe aupr~s de la Cour f~drale sous r6serve de
remplir certaines conditions prtalables. Un autre aspect
particulier de cc regime est qu'6tant donnd leur qualit6
d'action de groupe, la Cour poss~de des pouvoirs
6tendus pour mettre fin A des procedures qui respectent
les conditions exigtes. Cet article a pour but d'examiner
les questions conceptuelles et pratiques qui appuient
cette validit6, et d'utiliser ces pouvoirs pour mettre fin A
des actions de groupe introduites selon les r gles. Dans
le cadre de ]a prtsente evaluation, l'article examine en
profondeur les regimes des actions de groupe du Canada
et des Etats-Unis.
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................ 474
II. THE PART IVA REGIME ......................................... 478
A. The Recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission ...... 478
B. The Policy Goals of PART IVA .................................... 480
C. Section 33C's Commencement Prerequisites ......................... 481
II. JUDICIAL DISCONTINUANCE OF PROPERLY COMMENCED PART
IVA PROCEEDINGS ............................................. 482
A . O verview ..................................................... 482
B. Strategies Implemented by PART iVA Defendants ..................... 484
C. The North American Regimes .................................... 485
D . Section 33L .................................................. 487
E. Section 33M .................................................. 490
IV. SECTIO N 33N ................................................... 491
A . O verview ..................................................... 491
B. Paragraph (a) ................................................. 493
C. Paragraph (b) ................................................. 494
D . Paragraph (c) ................................................. 498
1. Practical Focus of Class Action Devices ...................... 502
2004, Vince Morabito.
BEc, LL.B. (Hons), LL.M., Ph.D. (Mon); Associate Professor, Department of Business Law and
Taxation, Monash University (Victoria, Australia).
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
2. The Judicial Economy Goal of Class Actions .................. 504
3. The General Scheme of PART IVA ........................... 506
E . Paragraph (d) ................................................. 508
V. CONCLU SION .................................................. 511
I. INTRODUCTION
The regime created pursuant to Rule 23 of the United States Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,' which has been regulating class actions in
American Federal Courts since 1938, constitutes the world's first
comprehensive class action regime.2 This rule, which was completely
redrafted in 1966 and amended in 2003, provides that "when a person sues
or is sued as a representative of a class, the court must-at an early
practicable time-determine by order whether to certify the action as a
class action."3
Certification regimes have been recommended by many law reform
bodies4 and similar entities in several Commonwealth countries.5 The eight
IU.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.
2 See Alberta Law Reform Institute, Class Actions (Final Report no. 85; 2000), at 30 [ALRI
Report]; and Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Consultation Paper on Multi-Party Litigation (Class
Actions) (Consultation Paper no. 25; 2003) at 29 [LRcO Report].
3 Supra note 1, Rule 23(c)(1)(A). A certification regime was also employed in the Uniform Class
Actions Act, drafted in the United States in 1976 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws: see I. Scher, "Opening State Courts to Class Actions: The Uniform Class Actions
Act" (1976) 32 Bus. Law. 75 at 86-87.
4 As indicated in 1995 by Ruth Rogers of the Ministry of the Attorney-General of British
Columbia, "[t]he first issue in any proposal for class action legislation is whether there is a need for a
preliminary step in the process called 'certification' or 'authorization': Ruth Rogers, "A Uniform Class
Actions Statute" (Appendix 0 to the Proceedings of the 1995 Meeting of the Uniform Law Conference
of Canada) at 4-5, online: <http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/95pro/e95o.htm>.
5 See Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions (Report no. 48; 1982) at 281-83,
307 [OLRc Report]; Report of the Attorney-General's Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform
(Toronto; 1990) at 30-32 [Ontario Committee Report]; Uniform Class Actions Act, s. 2. This draft Act
was adopted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1996, see the Proceedings of the Seventy-
Eighth Annual Meeting (Ottawa; 1996); Rogers, supra note 4 at 6; Lord Woolf, Access to Justice - Final
Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales (1996) at 229-30; Lord
Chancellor's Department, Representative Claims: Proposed New Procedures (Consultation Paper; 2001)
at paras. 19-20; LRCI Report, supra note 2 at 76; Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Class Proceedings
(Report no. 100; 1999) at 42-43 [MLRC Report]; ALR Report, supra note 2 at 86 (Recommendation
5(1)); Rules Committee of the Federal Court of Canada, Class Proceedings in the Federal Court of
Canada (Discussion Paper; 2000) at 38-39 [FC Committee Report]; Scottish Law Commission, Multi-
Party Actions (Scot. Law Com. no. 154; 1996) at 26; and South African Law Commission, The
Recognition ofA Class Action in South African Law (Project 88; Working Paper 57; 1995) at 59 [SALC].
See also, W le R De Vos, "Reflections on the Introduction of a Class Action in South Africa" (1996)
116 J. S. Afr. L. 639 at 645; Law Reform Committee of South Australia, Thirty-Sixth Report of the Law
Reform Committee of South Australia to the Attorney-General-Relating to Class Actions (Report no 36;
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Canadian jurisdictions that have, over the last twenty-four years or so, put
in place detailed frameworks to authorize and govern the prosecution of
class actions have all made the certification procedure a central aspect of
their regimes.6 Similarly, when new rules were introduced in 1987 to
regulate class actions in the Supreme Court of South Australia, a
certification procedure was implemented.7
But when a new PART IVA was added to the Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth.) 8 in 1992, enabling class actions to be brought in
the Federal Court of Australia, it did not include a requirement that those
proposing to assume the role of representative plaintiffs seek the
authorization of the Court before being able to avail themselves of the
PART IVA regime. The Australian Parliament's decision not to implement
a certification regime was based on a recommendation found in a report on
class action reform prepared by the Australian Law Reform Commission
(ALRC) in 1988. 9
Although it does not require representative plaintiffs to seek the
leave of the Court before being allowed to avail themselves of the PART IVA
regime, PART IVA nevertheless adopts an approach to the commencement
of class actions that is similar to that adhered to by class action regimes that
employ certification procedures. In fact, as is the case with certification
regimes, PART IVA sets out a list of prerequisites which must exist before a
proceeding may be brought pursuant to the PART IVA regime. Where a
proceeding is brought on behalf of a class in the Federal Court and some
1977) at 7 [LRCSA Report]. Certification regimes have also been recommended in jurisdictions outside
the Commonwealth. See e.g. Norwegian Civil Procedure Commission, Proposed Rules Concerning Group
Action (Provisional Draft issued by the Norwegian Civil Procedure Commission; 2000) at 1.
6 See Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec, R.S.Q. c. C-25, Book IX, art. 1002 [Quebec Code]; Class
Proceedings Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 2 [Ontario Act]; Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50, s. 2 [B.C.
Act]; Class Actions Act, SS 2001, c. C-12.01, s. 4 [Saskatchewan Act]; Class Actions Act, S.N.L. 2001, c.
C-18.1, s.3 [NewfoundlandAct]; The Class ProceedingsAct, S.M. 2002, c. 14,s. 2 [Manitoba Act]; Federal
Court Rules 1998 (SOR/98 - 106, Rule 299-12 [Federal Court Rules]; and Class Proceedings Act, S.A.
2003, c. C-16.5, s. 2 [Alberta Act]. A preference for the certification procedure was also recently
expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada: Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc v. Bennett Jones
Verchere (2001), 201 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at 399, McLachlin C.J.C. [Western Canadian].
7 The South Australian rules provide that "the representative parties must within twenty-eight days
after the day upon which the defendant filed a notice of address for service ... apply to the Court for:
(a) an order authorising the action to be maintained as a representative action; (b) directions as to the
conduct of the action": Supreme Court Rules 1987 (S.A.), Rule 34.02.
8 Federal Court ofAustralia Act 1976 (Cth.) [FCAA].
9 The Australian Law Reform Commission, Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (Report no.
46; 1988) at 63-64 [ALRC Report]. This rejection of a certification requirement has recently been
criticised by a leading U.S. commentator: Edward H. Cooper, "Class Action Advice in the Form of
Questions" (2001) 11 Duke J. of Comp. & Int'l L. 215 at 231-32.
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or all of the commencement prerequisites have not been met, the parties
opposing the class may seek the intervention of the Court and have the
proceedings terminated as PART IVA proceedings. Consequently, the lack
of a certification procedure has not resulted in a regime where defendants
and the courts are unable to prevent plaintiffs from bringing PART IVA
proceedings that may be unfair for defendants or class members.
On the contrary, it will be shown that the Federal Court has a
greater power to determine which proceedings should be conducted as class
actions than courts that have the power to withhold certification orders.
This state of affairs stems from differences in the power to discontinue
properly commenced class actions. In the United States and Canada, once
proceedings are certified as class actions, the power of the court to decertify
the proceedings, that is, to stop the proceedings from progressing as class
proceedings, is limited to a judicial determination that the certification
prerequisites no longer exist or never existed. In other words, certification
regimes do not empower courts to terminate properly constituted (or
certified) class actions pursuant to criteria or factors that are different from
those that are considered during the initial certification hearing. In some
Canadian jurisdictions, this power to decertify may not be exercised by the
Court on its own motion.
The scenario under Australia's PART IVA is fundamentally different.
It has already been pointed out that the Federal Court can bring PART IVA
proceedings to an end where it accepts the arguments of the defendants °
that the threshold criteria have not been satisfied. PART IVA also vests the
Federal Court with broad powers to terminate proceedings that have
adhered to the commencement prerequisites. In fact, these termination
powers, unlike the power of U.S. and Canadian courts to decertify, are not
dependent on a finding that the commencement prerequisites no longer
exist or never existed. Instead, these powers are based on additional
criteria, some of which confer on the court a very broad power, including
the ability to terminate a proceeding because the court is of the view that
it is "inappropriate" that the proceeding progress as a class proceeding. The
most significant of these powers, found in section 33N, may be exercised by
the court on its own motion.
The Court's wide discretion to terminate proceedings as class
proceedings raises a number of significant questions. What benefits are
expected to be secured through the exercise of these wide termination
powers? Are these powers in accordance with the philosophy underpinning
1 0 In the Federal Court of Australia, plaintiffs are referred to as applicants whilst defendants are
known as respondents. But in this article the conventional terms of plaintiffs and defendants will be
employed.
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PART IVA and class action regimes in general? What impact has the
existence of these powers had on the way in which PART IVA proceedings
are conducted? What effect have these powers had on the ability of groups
of claimants with similar legal grievances to access the Federal Court
through the PART IVA regime? Does the absence of a certification model
justify a power to discontinue that is not linked to the commencement
prerequisites?
In light of the importance of these conceptual and practical issues
raised by the Federal Court's ability to discontinue proceedings that have
been properly constituted as class proceedings, it is surprising that this
aspect of the PART IVA regime has been largely ignored by legal
commentators. 1 This article addresses this lacuna in the legal literature on
class actions.1
2
The picture that will emerge from this analysis is a largely
unsatisfactory one. It will be shown that there was confusion, on the part of
the drafters of PART IVA, as to the rationale for such powers as well as an
inability to appreciate both the adverse effect which such powers would
have on the ability of PART IVA to attain the policy goals that it was
designed to secure and the fact that such powers, especially the section 33N
power, are not necessary to protect class members and defendants facing
a PART IVA proceeding. Attention will also be drawn to the fact that these
termination powers have frequently resulted in courts spending more time
on assessing whether it is appropriate for a case to proceed as a class
proceeding than on the actual merits of the case. The need to avoid this
result was one of the principal reasons that prompted the ALRC to reject the
certification model.
The most unsatisfactory aspect of the Federal Court class action
landscape that will emerge from this study is that properly instituted class
proceedings have been discontinued by the Federal Court in circumstances
where the class action device represented the only means by which most of
the class members could seek access to legal remedies. PART IVA's
termination powers have also been exercised in circumstances where the
continuance of the class proceedings would have ensured effectuation of
the purposes of litigative efficiency and economy that the class action
11 The author was not able to find any articles in law journals that were entirely or substantially
devoted to a study of these issues.
12 In undertaking this analysis, reference will also be made to Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act
1986 (Vic.). Part 4A, which was deemed to have come into operation in January 2000 (see Cook v.
Pasminco Ltd., [2000] V.S.C. at para. 10, Hedigan J.), introduced in the Supreme Court of the
Australian State of Victoria a statutory class action regime that is virtually identical to the PART IVA
regime, including the provisions dealing with the commencement and termination of class actions.
2004] 477
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device is designed to serve.
II. THE PART IVA REGIME
A. The Recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission
In December 1988, the ALRC released a report titled Grouped
Proceedings in the Federal Court.13 This report contained a proposal to
introduce in the Federal Court a grouped-proceeding model. Pursuant to
this model, the representative plaintiffs and the class members would all be
formal parties to the grouped proceedings. 4 A unique and important
feature of the model proposed by the ALRC was the lack of mandatory
judicial certification, which would require that the representative plaintiff
seek the formal authorisation of the Court before being allowed to conduct
the proceedings on behalf of a group or class of claimants. 5 This rejection,
on the part of the ALRC, of a certification requirement was based on its
assessment of how such a requirement had worked in Quebec-the only
Canadian jurisdiction that had a detailed class action regime in place in
1988 when the ALRC completed its report-and in the United States. The
ALRC's review of these regimes led it to conclude that:
[T]he preliminary matter of the form of the proceedings has often been more complex and
taken more time than the hearing of the substantive issues. Because the court's discretion is
involved, appeals are frequent, leading to delays and further expense. These expenses are
wasteful and would discourage use of the procedure. There is no need to go to the expense
of a special hearing to determine that the requirements have been complied with as long as
the respondent has a right to challenge the validity of the procedure at any time. 6
13 ALRC Report, supra note 9.
1 4 Ibid. at 45.
15 The ALRC is not the only law reform entity to have rejected the certification model. In fact, in
1995 a commission formed by the Swedish Government recommended a group action regime that did
not include a certification procedure: see Roberth Nordh, "Group Actions in Sweden: Reflections on
the Purpose of Civil Litigation, the Need for Reform, and a Forthcoming Proposal" (2001) 11 Duke J.
Comp. & Int'l L. 381 at 396; Rogers, supra note 4,5; and SALC Report, supra note 5 at 58-59. The new
Swedish legislative group action regime, which commenced in January 2003, implemented this
recommendation: see Per Henrik Lindblom and Roberth Nordh, "Scandinavian Developments: The
New Swedish Act on Group Actions" (Paper presented at the Second Annual National Symposium on
Class Actions-Osgoode Hall Law School Professional Development Program; 13-14 September 2002)
at 3.
16 ALRC Report, supra note 9 at 63. A more colourful criticism of the certification procedure was
provided by a Canadian commentator who lamented that "anything but the traditional A versus B
litigation is treated as if it were a legal freak, a Frankenstein monster so dangerous that it must be kept
in a cage until the plaintiff (or plaintiff's lawyer) has devoted a massive investment of time and money
to a largely irrelevant ordeal." A. Roman as cited in Rogers, supra note 4 at 6.
[VOL. 42, NO. 3
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This passage clearly highlights the fact that the ALRC was not
rejecting the need for access to a class action regime to be dependent on
compliance with specified prerequisites. The ALRC simply rejected the
certification model as the most appropriate mechanism for determining
whether the commencement prerequisites were satisfied. In the ALRC'S
view, the issue of whether, in a given case, the requirements for
commencing a class action were complied with did not require a departure
from the traditional litigation model, pursuant to which "the onus of
establishing that any formal requirements have not been fulfilled" rests with
the defendant. 7
The rejection of a certification model was also based on the ALRC'S
conclusion that certification hearings do not always achieve one of their
main objectives, namely, protecting class members.18 The ALRC perceptively
drew attention to the fact that where the claims of the class members are
individually non-recoverable, the denial of certification on the basis that the
interests of the class members would not be adequately protected, would
represent a grossly unsatisfactory measure. This is because, by definition,
the class action device constitutes the only means by which persons with
those types of claims may seek access to legal remedies.
The ALRC was of the view that the interests of class members and
defendants could be protected by the selection of appropriate prerequisites
for the commencement of grouped proceedings and by the implementation
of a number of safeguards, including the conferral on the Federal Court of
the power to terminate, in very limited circumstances, proceedings that
have complied with the commencement criteria. According to the ALRC, a
grouped proceeding should only be brought where two requirements are
satisfied. The first requirement is that the material facts giving rise to each
claim for relief, as pleaded in the statement of claim in respect of each class
member's proceeding, must be the same as, or related to, the material facts
giving rise to a claim for relief in the representative plaintiff's proceeding.
This requirement is intended "to ensure a community of interest between
the principal applicant and group members and to prevent disparate
matters from being brought together."' 9 The other requirement is that
there must be at least one question which is the same or common in the
principal proceeding and in each class member's proceeding. In the ALRC'S
opinion, "[u]nless such a requirement is imposed the advantages of
grouping may easily be outweighed by diversity and unmanageability of the
17
ALRC Report, supra note 9 at 63.
18 Ibid. at 63-64.
19 Ibid. at 58.
2004]
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issues.""
The ALRC also indicated that grouped proceedings may be
inappropriate, as distinct from vexatious or open to abuse, in four
circumstances. 2 The first circumstance is where the overall costs of a
grouped proceeding to the parties and to the administration of justice are
more than the combined costs of separate proceedings by the class
members.22 The second is where the cost of identifying class members and
distributing any monetary relief is excessive.23 Thirdly, the ALRC stated that
a grouped proceeding may be inappropriate when the representative
plaintiff has excluded potential class members by defining the class too
narrowly.24 The ALRC recommended that there should be an express power
for the Court to terminate the proceedings as grouped proceedings if the
first two circumstances mentioned above are encountered. The solution to
the third was to confer upon the Court the express power to stay the
proceedings to allow the representative plaintiff to amend the application
so as to ensure that the proceedings will bind all members of the relevant
group. The ALRC also concluded that the Court should have the power to
decide whether grouped proceedings should be allowed to continue where
there were fewer than seven class members 5
B. The Policy Goals of PARTIVA
The Bill gives the Federal Court an efficient and effective procedure to deal with multiple
claims. Such a procedure is needed for two purposes. The first is to provide a real remedy
where, although many people are affected and the total amount at issue is significant, each
person's loss is small and not economically viable to recover in individual actions. It will thus
give access to the courts to those in the community who have been effectively denied justice
because of the high cost of taking action [the access to justice goal].
The second purpose of the Bill is to deal efficiently with the situation where the damages
sought by each claimant are large enough to justify individual actions and a large number of
persons wish to sue the respondent. The new procedure will mean that groups of persons,
whether they be shareholders or investors, or people pursuing consumer claims, will be able
to obtain redress and do so more cheaply and efficiently than would be the case with
2 0 Ibid. at 59.
21 Ibid. at 64.
22 Ibid. at 65.
23 Ibid. at 65-66.
2 4 Ibid. at 66-67.
2 5 Ibid. at 60-61.
[VOL. 42, NO. 3
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individual actions [the judicial economy goal]. 6
These comments quoted above were made in 1991 by the then
Australian Attorney-General, Mr. Duffy, while explaining the objectives of
the new class action regime that his government was introducing in the
Federal Court, through the addition of a new PART IVA to the FCAA.27 PART
IVA implements the ALRC's recommendation not to impose a certification
requirement. But it adopts a class action model, instead of the grouped-
proceeding model recommended by the ALRC. Pursuant to a class action
model, the class members are bound by the outcome of the class proceeding
despite the fact that only the representative plaintiffs and the defendants
are formal parties to the proceeding. 28
C. Section 33C's Commencement Prerequisites
A proceeding is not properly commenced as a PART IVA proceeding
unless it satisfies each of the three threshold criteria specified in section
33C( 1):29
(a) 7 or more persons have claims against the same person; and
(b) the claims of all those persons are in respect of, or arise out of, the same, similar or
related circumstances; and
(c) the claims of all those persons give rise to a substantial common issue of law or fact.
30
Section 33C(2)(a) provides that a class suit may be commenced
whether or not the relief sought is, or includes, equitable relief; consists of,
2 6 Austl., Commonwealth, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (14 November 1991)
at 3174 (Mr. Michael Duffy, Attorney-General). Similar reasoning was embraced by the Victorian
Attorney-General, Mr. Hulls, when he introduced in the Victorian Parliament Part 4A: Austl., Victoria,
Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (31 October 2000) at 1252.
2 7 Supra note 8.
28 See Hansberry v. Lee,311 U.S. 32 at 40-41 (1940); ALRI Report, supra note 2 at 25; Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762, n. 2 (1989); and Research Corp v. PfisterAssociated Growers Inc, 301 F.Supp.
497, 501 (ND I11 1969): "the very nature of a class action ... [is] to bind parties not before the court in
person."
29 See Wong v. Silkfield Pty Ltd, (1999) 165 A.L.R. 373 at 381, Gleeson C.J., McHugh, Gummow,
Kirby & Callinan JJ. [Wong]; Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v. Nixon (2000), 170 A.L.R. 487 at 514,
Sackville J. [Philip Morris]. Section 33C(1) of Victoria's Part 4A contains identical prerequisites.
3 0 Supra note 8, s. 33C(1). Finkelstein J. of the Federal Court has recently lamented that "[ult is
by no means clear precisely how and when the applicant must satisfy the Court that the conditions in
s. 33C(1) have been met": Au Domain Administration Limited v. Domain Names Australia Pty Ltd.
(2003), 202 A.L.R. 127 at 129 [Au Domain].
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or includes, damages; includes claims for damages that would require
individual assessment; or is the same for each person represented. Section
33C(2)(b) provides that a proceeding may be brought under PART IVA
whether or not the proceeding is concerned with separate contracts or
transactions between the defendant in the proceeding and individual group
members and whether or not it involves separate acts or omissions of the
defendant done or omitted to be done in relation to individual group
members."
III. JUDICIAL DISCONTINUANCE OF PROPERLY
COMMENCED PART IVA PROCEEDINGS
A. Overview
When explaining the major features of the PART IVA regime, Mr.
Duffy indicated that "[tihe other main feature of the Bill is the
comprehensive powers given to the Court to ensure that the proceedings
are not abused.32 The then Attorney-General mentioned subsections
33ZG(b), 33L, 33M, and 33N as illustrations of PART IVA's anti-abuse
powers. But only section 33ZG(b) may accurately be described as a
measure intended to prevent abuse.33 Section 33ZG(b) provides that
nothing in PART IVA affects "the Court's powers under provisions other
than this Part, for example, its powers in relation to a proceeding in which
no reasonable cause of action is disclosed or that is oppressive, vexatious,
frivolous or an abuse of the process of the Court. 34
Section 33L provides that where, at any stage of the PART IVA
proceeding, it appears likely that there are fewer than seven class members,
the court is empowered to order that the proceeding continue as a PART
IVA proceeding or that the proceeding no longer continue as a PART IVA
proceeding. Section 33M empowers the Court to order the termination of
a PART IVA proceeding where the cost to the defendant of identifying the
class members and distributing to them the damages won by the
representative plaintiff would be excessive, having regard to the likely total
of those amounts. This power may only be exercised upon an application
31 Wong, supra note 29 at 376.
3 2 Austl., Commonwealth, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (14 November 1991)
at 3175 (Mr. Michael Duffy).
3 3 See FemcareLtd. v. Bright (2000), 172 A.L.R.713 at 734, Black C.J., Sackville & Emmett JJ.; and
ALRC Report, supra note 9 at 63.
34 Supra, note 8.
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by the defendant.
Under section 33N(1) the Court, on application by the defendant
or of its own motion, can order that the proceeding no longer continue as
a PART IVA proceeding where it is satisfied that it is in the interests of
justice to do so because:
(a) the costs that would be incurred if the proceeding were to continue as a representative
proceeding are likely to exceed the costs that would be incurred if each group member
conducted a separate proceeding; or
(b) all the relief sought can be obtained by means of a proceeding other than a representative
proceeding under this Part; or
(c) the representative proceeding will not provide an efficient and effective means of dealing
with the claims of group members; or
(d) it is otherwise inappropriate that the claims be pursued by means of a representative
proceeding.
Sections 33L, 33M, and 33N of Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act
1986 (Vic) are identical to PART IVA'S subsections 33L, 33M, and 33N, with
one interesting exception: section 33N of the Victorian regime, unlike its
Federal counterpart,35 may not be activated by the Supreme Court of
Victoria on its own initiative.
Section 33P provides that where the court orders the
discontinuance of a class suit under subsections 33L, 33M, or 33N, the
proceeding may be continued as a proceeding by the representative party
on his or her own behalf and "on the application of a person who was a
group member for the purposes of the proceeding, the Court may order
that the person be joined as an applicant in the proceeding. 3 6
To the author's knowledge, the Federal Court has yet to issue a termination order on its own
initiative. However, there have been instances of Federal Court judges "encouraging" PART IVA
defendants to lodge s. 33N applications: see Vasram v. AMP Life Limited, [2000] F.C.A. 1676 at para.
15 and [2001] F.C.A. 602 at para. 1, Stone J. [Vasram cited to [2000] F.C.A. 1676]; and Bowler v. Hilda
Pty Ltd (25 October 1996), No ACT G13 of 1995 (Federal Court) at 7, Finn J.
36 Supra, note 8.
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B. Strategies Implemented by PART IVA Defendants
The existence, and the uncertainty concerning the ambit,37 of
provisions such as section 33N have had an adverse effect on the way in
which PART IVA litigation is generally conducted. Many defendants facing
a PART IVA proceeding have brought motions before the Federal Court
requesting it to exercise the power available under subsections 33L, 33M,
and 33N to bring the proceedings, as PART IVA proceedings, to an end.38
Frequently, these applications on the part of PART IVA defendants, have
been accompanied by submissions to the effect that the proceedings had
failed to satisfy one of the requirements found in section 33C(1). 3 9 These
strategies have been partly responsible for the unsatisfactory scenario
recently described as follows by Justice Finkelstein of the Full Federal
Court:
There is a disturbing trend that is emerging in representative proceedings which is best
brought to an end. I refer to the numerous interlocutory applications [lodged by defendants],
including interlocutory appeals, that occur in such proceedings. This case is a particularly
good example. The respondents have not yet delivered their defences yet there have been
approximately seven or eight contested interlocutory hearings before a single judge, one
application to a Full Court and one appeal to the High Court. I would not be surprised if the
applicants' legal costs are by now well in excess of $500,000. I say nothing about the
respondents' costs. This is an intolerable situation .... 40
It would therefore appear reasonable to assert that the
unfavourable scenario-of numerous motions and hearings as to whether
the proceedings may be maintained as class proceedings-that prompted
the ALRC in 1988 to reject the use of certification regimes currently exists
See, e.g. S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, "Multi-Plaintiff Litigation in Australia: A
Comparative Perspective" (2001) 11 Duke J. Comp & Int'l L. 289 at 303 where the conclusion is
reached that "[t]he extent to which the courts will be prepared to exercise the power to terminate class
actions has yet to be determined."
The author is aware of more than 20 PART IVA proceedings where applications to terminate
properly commenced PART IVA proceedings were lodged.
See Jocelyn Kellam & S. Stuart Clark, "Multi-Party Actions in Australia" in Christopher
Hodges, ed., Multi-Party Actions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 269 at para. 15.51; Peta
Spender, "Securities Class Actions: A View from the Land of the Great White Shareholder" (2002) 31
Com. L. World Rev. 123 at 139; R. Freeman, "Class Actions the Australian Way" (1999) 10 Austl.
Product Liability Rep. 109 at 109; and Barry Lipp, "Mass Tort Class Actions under the Federal Court
of Australia Act: Justice for All or Justice Denied?" (2002) 28 Monash U.L. Rev. 360 at 367, 373. This
"double attack" strategy was implemented by defendants within twelve months of PART IVA coming into
operation: see Zhang v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (15 February
1993), No. WAG 214 of 1992 (Federal Court), French J.
4 0 Bright v. Femcare Limited (2002), 195 A.L.R. 574 at 607 [Bright]. See alsoBray v. FHoffmann-La
Roche Ltd. (2003), 200 A.L.R. 607 at 660, Finkelstein J.
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in the Federal Court, despite the non-employment of such regimes.
C. The North American Regimes
Before considering in detail subsections 33L, 33M, and 33N, it is
useful to consider the mechanisms that American and Canadian class
action regimes have in place to determine which group litigation should be
conducted as a class proceeding. As noted above, in the United States, Rule
23 provides that "the court must-at an early practicable time-determine
by order whether to certify the action as a class action."'" In Quebec, a class
action may not be commenced except with the prior approval of the court
obtained on a motion.42 In the other seven Canadian jurisdictions that have
detailed class action regimes in place, the plaintiff is required to apply to
the court for an order certifying the proceeding as a class proceeding and
appointing the plaintiff as a representative plaintiff, generally within ninety
days after a defence has been filed.43
Properly commenced class proceedings may be discontinued as class
actions or decertified by U.S. and Canadian Courts only where the
certification criteria are no longer met. Section 10 of British Columbia's
Class Proceedings Act,44 for instance, empowers the court, at any time after
a certification order has been issued, to amend the certification order,
decertify the proceedings, or make any other order it considers appropriate
if the certification criteria are not satisfied. Once the proceedings are
decertified, section 10(2) of the BC Act empowers the court to permit the
proceedings to continue as one or more proceedings between different
parties and may order the addition, deletion, or substitution of parties; the
amendment of the pleadings; or may make any other order that it considers
appropriate. 45 Rule 23 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, does
not expressly deal with decertification. Rule 23(c)(1)(C) simply provides
that a certification order "may be altered or amended before final
41 Supra note 1, Rule 23(c)(1)(A).
42 Quebec Code, supra note 6, art. 1002.
43 OntarioAct, supra note 6, s. 2(3); BCAct, supra note 6, s. 2(3); Saskatchewan Act, supra note 6,
s. 4(3); NewfoundlandAct, supra note 6, s. 3(3); Manitoba Act, supra note 6, s. 2(3); Federal Court Rules,
supra note 6, Rule 299.17; and Alberta Act, supra note 6, s. 2(3).
44 [BC Act], supra note 6.
45 See also Quebec Code, supra note 6, art 1022; Ontario Act, supra note 6, s. 10; Saskatchewan Act,
supra note 6, s. 12; NewfoundlandAct, supra note 6, s. 11; ManitobaAct, supra note 6, s. 10; Federal Court
Rules, supra note 6, Rule 299.21; andAlbertaAct, supra note 6, s. 11. The Ontario and Quebec regimes
do not empower the court to decertify proceedings on its own motion.
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judgment. 4 6 American courts have, nevertheless, adopted an approach to
decertification that is similar to that mandated by the Canadian class action
regimes.47
The rationale for this narrow decertification power in Canadian
class action regimes was succinctly explained by the Manitoba Law Reform
Commission:
That procedure balances the need to ensure that claims that have been inappropriately
certified do not continue, on the one hand, with the need to limit unnecessary and wasteful
interlocutory litigation over the appropriateness of the certification.'
A review of the certification criteria that Canadian representative
plaintiffs need to comply with reveals another significant problem with the
way in which Australia's PART IVA regulates the types of proceedings that
may be brought as class proceedings. In Quebec, there are four certification
criteria that need to be adhered to: (a) the claims of the group raise
identical, similar or related questions of law or fact; (b) the facts alleged
seem to justify the conclusions sought; (c) joinder is difficult and
impracticable; and (d) the representative plaintiff will adequately represent
the class.49
In the other seven Canadian jurisdictions that have class action
regimes in place, courts are required to certify proceedings as class
proceedings where five conditions have been satisfied. The first condition
is that the pleadings disclose a cause of action. The second is that there is
an identifiable class of two or more persons that would be represented by
the representative plaintiff. The third is that the claims of the class
members raise common issues. The fourth is that a class proceeding would
be the preferable procedure for the resolution of the common issues. The
final condition is that there is a representative plaintiff who would fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the class; has produced a plan for
the proceeding that sets out a workable method of advancing the
proceeding on behalf of the class and of notifying class members of the
proceeding; and does not have, on the common issues for the class, an
46 Supra note 1, Rule 23(c)(1)(C).
47 See, e.g. In re Itel Securities Litigation 89 F.R.D. 104 at 113 (N.D. Cal 1981); Pennsylvania v.
Local Union, 542 90 F.R.D. 589 at 591 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Monaco v. Stone 187 F.R.D. 50, 59 (E.D.N.Y.
1999); and Alvarado Partners LP v. Mehta 130 F.R.D. 673 at 676 (D. of Colorado 1990).
48 MLRC Report, supra note 5 at 60. See also FC Committee Report, supra note 5 at 48-49; and
OLRC Report, supra note 5 at 434.
49 Quebec Code, supra note 6, art 1003. The certification criteria in South Australia are even easier
to satisfy than the Quebec criteria. In fact, Rule 34.01 only requires the existence of "numerous persons
[who] have common questions of fact or law requiring adjudication."
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interest in conflict with the interests of other class members. 0
With the possible exception of the fourth requirement (which will
be explored in PART IV below), these requirements, unlike Australia's PART
IVA termination criteria, are reasonably easy to apply as they predominantly
require consideration of objective and clear factors. Another virtue of these
criteria is that they do not result in the erection of significant barriers to the
use of the class action device. This desirable state of affairs was the result
of a decision by the various law reform bodies, upon whose
recommendations most Canadian class action regimes were based, not to
employ the Rule 23 certification criteria. This decision not to emulate the
American regime was attributable to the fact that the certification criteria
employed by Rule 23 had been found to be unduly restrictive and
ambiguous.5' The U.S. certification criteria are discussed below, in the
analysis of section 33N(1)(c).
D. Section 33L
Section 33L implemented a recommendation of the ALRC. This
recommendation was based on the view that the grouping procedure should
be available as long as there are, in addition to the representative plaintiff,
seven class members. However, the ALRC also pointed out that there may
be instances where it would be appropriate to have group litigation despite
the fact that there are fewer than seven class members. Consequently, it
recommended that "[i]n these circumstances, the Court should have a
discretion to allow grouped proceedings to continue or to separate the
proceedings and direct that they continue as individual proceedings.""
It is important to note that a crucial aspect of the ALRC'S
recommendation was that the existence of a class with at least seven class
members was not a condition that needed to be satisfied in order to initiate
a grouped proceeding. This recommendation was consistent with the
ALRC's recognition that there will be circumstances where group litigation
might be beneficial despite the small size of the class. It was also a logical
move given that an important aspect of the ALRC's regime was the
employment of an opt-out device. Under such regimes, the representative
50 See Ontario Act, supra note 6, s. 5(1); B.C. Act, supra note 6, s. 4(1); Saskatchewan Act, supra
note 6, s. 6;NewfoundlandAct,supra note 6, s. 5(l); Manitoba Act, supra note 6, s. 4; Federal Court Rules,
supra note 6, Rule 299.18(1); andAlberta Act, supra note 6, s. 5(1).
See e.g. MLRC Report, supra note 5 at 37.
52 ALRC Report, supra note 9 at 61.
Tropical Shine Holdings Pty Ltd. v. Lake Gesture Pty Ltd. (1993), 118 A.L.R. 510 at 514, Wilcox
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plaintiffs are not required to seek the consent of the class members before
initiating group litigation on their behalf. Consequently, representative
plaintiffs are frequently not in a position to provide precise details to the
court as to the size of the class.54
PART IVA also implements an opt-out regime. Class members have
the right to opt out of the class action before a date fixed by the court and,
except with the leave of the court, the hearing of the action is not to
commence earlier than the date before which a class member may opt out
of the proceeding.55 A judgment handed down in a class action "binds all
such persons [described or otherwise identified in the judgment] other than
any person who has opted out of the proceeding. 5 6 In order to
accommodate this opt out model, section 33H(2) provides that an
application commencing a PART IVA proceeding, in describing or otherwise
identifying class members to whom the suit relates, need not "name, or
specify the number of, the group members."57 But, despite the section
33H(2) directive, the existence of at least seven class members was included
as a requirement for initiating PART IVA proceedings.58 The lack of clarity
on this issue was, of course, intensified by the conferral on the court of the
discretion to allow the use of the PART IVA regime despite a failure to
satisfy such a requirement.
This tension between the opt-out device and section 33L and the
threshold requirements of section 33C(1)(a)59 has resulted in conflicting
views among Federal Court justices as to how the discretion provided to the
Court by section 33L should be exercised. In Tropical Shine Holdings Pry
Ltd. v. Lake Gesture Pty Ltd.,6' Justice Wilcox indicated that to terminate
a PART IVA proceeding because there are fewer than seven class members
"would be a drastic course, often productive of injustice and inconvenience;
and it would conflict with the policy expressed by section 51 of the Federal
54 See Bright v. Femcare Limited, [2000] F.C.A. 1179 at para. 19, Lehane J.; Mobil OilAustralia Pty
Ltd v. Victoria (2002), 189 A.L.R. 161 at 163-64, Gleeson C.J.; and Au Domain, supra note 30 at 129,
Finkelstein J. The ALRC's recognition of this fact led it to recommend that the initiating process need
not name, or specify the number of, the class members: ALRC Report, supra note 9 at 157.
55Supra note 8, s. 33J.
56 Supra note 8, s. 33ZB.
57 Supra note 8, s. 33H(2).
58 Supra note 53.
59With respect to s. 33C(1)(a) this problem has been addressed by holding that this provision is
complied with where the representative plaintiff can demonstrate that it is likely that the group consists
of at least seven members: see supra note 53 at 514, Wilcox J.; Marks v. GIO Australia Holdings Ltd.
(1996), 63 F.C.R. 304 at 315, Einfeld J. [Marks]; and Au Domain, supra note 30 at 129, Finkelstein J.
60 Supra note 53.
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Court of Australia Act that proceedings are not invalidated by a formal
defect or irregularity unless the Court thinks substantial and irremediable
injustice has occurred." 61
A substantially different approach was followed in Falfire Pty Ltd.
v. Roger David Stores Pty Ltd.,62 Justice Kiefel noted that while it could not
be said that, as a result of section 33L, there is a presumption that a PART
IVA proceeding requires more than seven class members, section 33L must
be taken as a clear legislative directive that the employment of the PART
IVA procedure may not be appropriate with respect to the claims of small
groups. Justice Kiefel concluded that in cases where there are fewer than
seven class members, the representative plaintiff "ought to be in a position
to show why it is necessary or preferable to continue the proceedings in
their present form., 63 Similarly, in Gold Coast City Council v. Pioneer
Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd.,64 the court held that the representative plaintiff
needed to furnish evidence to demonstrate the existence of at least seven
class members who were interested in recovering losses suffered as a result
of the defendant's conduct by means of a class proceeding.
Falfire and Gold Coast would tend to suggest that once the use of
the PART IVA regime is challenged by the defendant facing the class action,
there may be little difference between PART IVA and certification regimes,
as far as a practical issue is concerned. This issue relates to which party
bears the onus of proof, with respect to the crucial question of whether the
aspiring representative plaintiff should be allowed to represent a class of
claimants.65 The judicial approach in Falfire and Gold Coast may be
criticised for largely ignoring the directive in section 33L that, in the event
of a PART IVA class being comprised of less than seven class members, one
of the options that is available to the court is to allow the PART IVA
litigation to proceed.
A further criticism may be levelled at Gold Coast. Making access to
PART IVA dependent on clear evidence of the existence of seven class
members, and on the fact that each of the represented persons was
interested in seeking legal redress through the PART IVA proceeding, is
61 Supra note 53 at 515. See also Marks, supra note 59 at 315, Einfeld J. But see Paul Lynch,
"Representative Actions in the Federal Court of Australia" (1994-95) 12 Austl. Bar Rev. 159 at 168, n.
28.
62 (25 September 1996), No. Q.G. 201 of 1995 (Federal Court), Kiefel J. [Falfire].
63 ibid. at 3.
(9 July 1997), No. Q.G. 190 of 1996 (Federal Court) Drummond J. [Gold Coast].
65 See also Bray v. FHoffmann-La Roche Ltd (2002), 190 A.L.R. 1 at 16, Merkel J. [Bray]. But see
Finance Sector Union of Australia v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia, [1999] F.C.A. 824 at para. 38,
O'Connor J.
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inconsistent with the opt-out regime employed in PART IVA and is
tantamount to the introduction of an opt-in regime.66
E. Section 33M
Section 33M implements a recommendation of the ALRC. The ALRC
justified the power to terminate group litigation-where the cost of
identifying class members and distributing amounts awarded would be
excessive having regard to the likely total of those amounts-on the basis
that "[a] primary goal of the proposed procedure is that of achieving legal
redress where this can be done efficiently, rather than imposing punishment
on a respondent.,
67
Section 33M has been criticized because it leaves class members
without remedy just because they are disparate and their individual claims
are relatively small. This is inconsistent with the access to justice aim of
PART IVA and hinders the ability of PART IVA proceedings to enforce the
law and discourage unlawful behaviour.68 What is commonly referred to as
behaviour modification has been regarded as one of the benefits that
should result from the employment of the class action device. As recently
noted by the Supreme Court of Canada: "[C]lass actions serve efficiency
and justice by ensuring that actual and potential wrongdoers modify their
behaviour to take full account of the harm they are causing, or might cause,
to the public.,
69
Some of the problems discussed above could have been avoided had
the Australian Parliament endorsed the amendments to section 33M
proposed by the Australian Democrats. Under their proposed scheme, the
scenario described in section 33M would not authorize the termination of
66 N. Francey, "Class Actions" (Paper presented in Sydney on 9 February 1998 at the New South
Wales Bar Association Continuing Legal Education Program) at 18-19. Similar criticism may be levelled
at some of the reasoning that prompted Justice Lindgren to issue a section 33N order in Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission v. Giraffe WorldAustralia Ply Ltd. (1998), 156 A.L.R. 273 at 294
[Giraffe World]: "[T]here is no evidence as to the wishes of the group members.... I take into account
the real possibility of a conflict between the wishes of the [class representative] and [certain class
members] as a factor weighing in favour of the making of an order that the proceeding no longer
continue under Pt IVA."
67 ALRC Report, supra note 9 at 65.
68 Coalition for Class Actions, Representative Proceedings in New South Wales:A Review of the Law
and a Proposalfor Reform (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Sydney; 1995) at 20,30-31 [PIAC Report];
and Austl., Commonwealth, Senate, Parliamentary Debates (13 November 1991) at 3025 (Senator
Spindler).
6 9 Hollick v. Toronto (City),[2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 at 170, (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 19, McLachlin
C.J.C. (S.C.C.) [Hollick cited to S.C.R.]].
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a proceeding as a PART IVA proceeding. Instead, the court would have the
discretion to direct that the class members in question not be paid. The
representative plaintiffs could, however, apply to the court to have those
funds transferred to a federal, state, or territory legal aid fund.7' An
alternative option would be to divert those funds to a public fund to finance
class actions. These funds exist in a number of Canadian jurisdictions and
have been recommended by the ALRC and the Law Reform Committee of
South Australia.71
For section 33M to operate in a manner that is consistent with both
the access to justice and the behaviour modification goals of class actions,
an enlightened judicial approach, such as the one displayed by Justice
O'Loughlin inAustralian Competition and Consumer Commission v. Golden
Sphere International,2 is necessary. Justice O'Loughlin declined to issue a
section 33M order. This refusal was justified on the following basis:
This submission is entirely devoid of merit. Findings have been made against the respondents
that they have knowingly engaged in breaches of the [Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.)]:
various sums of money, including an amount of $254,650, have been intercepted by the
authorities and if this submission was accepted those moneys would be disbursed to the
respondents. That is enough to dismiss this submission summarily.73
IV. SECTION 33N
A. Overview
Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of section 33N(1) were not based on
any recommendations of the ALRC. In light of this significant departure
from the ALRC'S proposed regime with respect to what is, undoubtedly, one
of the most important provisions of PART IVA, one would have expected a
detailed explanation, in either the second reading speech on the Bill that
contained PART IVA or in the Bill's Explanatory Memorandum, of the
rationale for, and the intended operation of, these additional termination
powers. Unfortunately, each of these official documents simply contains the
inaccurate statement that section 33N was intended to empower the Court
70 Austl., Commonwealth, Senate, Parliamentary Debates (13 November 1991) at 3034.
71 See Vince Morabito, "Federal Class Actions, Contingency Fees, and the Rules Governing
Litigation Costs" (1995) 21 Monash U.L. Rev. 231 at 265-70; Thomas D. Rowe Jr., "Shift Happens:
Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee Paradigms from Class Actions" (2003) 13 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L.
125 at 136-38, 145-46; Cooper, supra note 9 at 246; and LRCI Report, supra note 2 at 41-42, 102-03.
72 (1998), 83 F.C.R. 424.
73 Ibid. 447. See also Bray, supra note 65 at 15, Merkel J.
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to prevent abuse of the PART IVA regime.74 These documents also contain
illustrations of the circumstances that may justify the exercise of the power
contained in paragraph (b).75 As the analysis of paragraph (b) will show,
these examples are disconcerting as they would clearly undermine the
ability of PART IVA to achieve the objectives that the drafters of PART IVA
sought to secure through the introduction of such a regime.
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the limited information
provided by the creators of PART IVA as to the reasoning behind the
enactment of section 33N evinces an alarming lack of clarity as to the
problems that provisions such as section 33N were intended to deal with,
and the impact that such powers might have on the ability of PART IVA to
go beyond the limitations of the representative action procedure, the
joinder procedure, and the test case device, and achieve an effective
mechanism for dealing with legal disputes involving multiple claimants. 6
Therefore it is not surprising that, despite the fact that PART IVA
has been in operation for more than twelve years, some uncertainty
surrounds the crucial question of when the extensive termination powers
contained in section 33N will be exercised 77 by the Federal Court. 78 Before
considering the impact of each paragraph of section 33N(1), it is important
to draw attention to a general feature of the Federal Court's approach to
section 33N. In the first few years of operation of PART IVA, section 33N
was rarely given an independent function by the Court. In this period,
judicial conclusions that the relevant class suits were properly initiated were
usually followed by a refusal to order that the actions should no longer
continue as class actions.79 Similarly, whenever the Court ruled that there
had not been compliance with one or more of the prerequisites for the
74 Explanatory Memorandum to the Federal Court of Australia (Amendment) Bill 1991 (Cth.)
at para. 23 [Memo]; Commonwealth, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (14 November
1991), 3175 (Mr. Michael Duffy, Attorney-General) [Debates].
75 Ibid.
76 See Mobil Oil v. Victoria (2002), 189 A.L.R. 161 at 169, Gaudron, Gummow & Hayne JJ. [Mobil
Oil]; and Dagi v. Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited, [2000] V.S.C. 486 at para. 40, Hedigan J.
[Dagi].
7 7 It is important, however, to appreciate a general feature, concerning the judicial interpretation
of provisions governing class actions, that may have contributed to this level of uncertainty concerning
s. 33N. This feature has been explained as follows by Hedigan J. of the Supreme Court of Victoria in
Dagi, ibid. at para. 44: "[t]he inherent compromises involved in the establishment of class
actions-group proceedings may be productive of judicial responses and perspectives of some
variation."
78 See Dagi, ibid. at para. 41, Hedigan J.; and Kellam & Clark, supra note 39 at para. 15.53.
79 See e.g. Marks, supra note 59; Huangv. Minister for Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs (1997),
50 A.L.D. 134 [Huang]; and supra note 53.
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commencement of class suits found in section 33C(1), it would usually also
reach the conclusion that, even if the class suit in question could be said to
have been properly brought, the circumstances of the case justified the
exercise of the Court's power to stop the litigation progressing as a PART
IVA proceeding.8°
Consequently, section 33N did not constitute an additional obstacle
for litigants acting on behalf of classes. Once the representative plaintiff
was able to convince the court that the suit satisfied the prerequisites for
the commencement of a PART IVA suit, the court was then unlikely to be
persuaded that there existed grounds for the exercise of the Court's power
to stop the continuance of such a suit. It is crucial to note that, during this
period, most Federal Court judges interpreted PART IVA in an extremely
flexible and broad manner.81
But from approximately the late 1990s onwards, there was an
evident willingness, on the part of a significant number of Federal Court
judges to give section 33N a role independent of section 33C(1), by
exercising the section 33N power where section 33C(1) had been complied
with.82 This greater prominence of section 33N resulted from the adoption,
by an increasing number of judges, of a narrow construction of PART IVA
provisions.83 The important point, for present purposes, is that these
changes in the impact of section 33N highlight quite vividly the inherently
subjective nature of some of the major concepts contained in section 33N.
B. Paragraph (a)
Justice Lindgren has explained that this provision requires the court
"to hypothesize that each group member conducts a separate proceeding."'
But that task is rendered extremely difficult by the impossibility in many
PART IVA proceedings of having precise details concerning the members of
the class represented by the named plaintiff, because of the opt-out regime
mentioned above.
The practical relevance of this paragraph is questionable given that
80 See e.g. Soverina Pty Ltd v. NatwestAustraliaBankLtd. (1993), 40 F.C.R. 452; Connell v. Nevada
Financial Group Ply Ltd. (1996), 139 A.L.R. 723.
81 Clark & Harris, supra note 37 at 320.
82 See Lipp, supra note 39 at 375.
83 See Clark & Harris, supra note 37 at 303-04 and 319-20. The clearest example of this new
judicial approach was the Full Federal Court's decision in Philip Morris, supra note 29 where a narrow
construction of a number of provisions of PART IVA, including s. 33C(1), was embraced.
84 Giraffe World, supra note 66 at 293.
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it is difficult to think of circumstances where the total costs of at least seven
individual proceedings would not exceed the costs of one class proceeding.
It is therefore not surprising that PART IVA proceedings have been
terminated on the basis of this provision on only two occasions. On the
first occasion, the discontinuance appeared to have been based more on the
court's belief that the class probably comprised less than seven class
members than on a genuine assessment that the costs of the class action
would exceed the combined costs of the individual proceedings that might
be pursued by the class members.86
In the other PART IVA proceeding where a section 33N(1)(a) order
was issued,87 it was set aside by the Full Federal Court. The Full Court's
decision was explained as follows by Justice Finkelstein:
The only foundation for the finding that the costs of many individual actions are likely to be
less than the cost of one representative proceeding is an unsubstantiated assertion by the
solicitor acting for the first respondent. ... [In the absence of a compelling explanation I
would place no weight on such a statement because it is inherently unlikely to be true.
Moreover, while the evidence shows that there are 61 group members known to the
applicant's solicitors, the total number of group members is not yet known. That
circumstance alone is sufficient to render irrelevant the solicitor's evidence: how could he say
that one representative action would be more costly than many actions when he is unable to
specify the number of actions with which the comparison is being made? In any event I
simply do not accept that one action can cost more than what may amount to hundreds of
actions. 8
C. Paragraph (b)
It will be recalled that this paragraph empowers the court to
terminate properly commenced PART IVA proceedings where "all the relief
sought can be obtained by means of a proceeding other than" a PART IVA
proceeding. In the second reading speech, it is explained that the court will
be able to discontinue a PART IVA proceeding where "the relief sought
could be obtained by means of an individual proceeding. ' 89 The Attorney
General may have been referring to a situation where the individual claims
of the named plaintiffs and the class members may justify the initiation of
individual proceedings; that is to say, where their claims are individually
85 See also Soverina (1993), 40 F.C.R. 452 at 456.
86 Supra note 64, and accompanying text.
8 7 Bright v. Ferncare Limited (2001), 188 A.L.R. 633.
88 Bright, supra note 40 at 606. See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v.
Golden Sphere International (1998), 83 F.C.R. 424 at 447, O'Loughlin J.; Giraffe World, supra note 66
at 293, Lindgren J.
8 9 Debates, supra note 74.
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recoverable. But in such circumstances the exercise of the power to
discontinue PART IVA proceedings would be totally unsatisfactory. The
major rationale for the class action device itself, the access to justice goal,
and one of the essential features of the opt-out model-allowing the
commencement of a class suit without the need to obtain the express
consent of the affected class members9° -both constitute a clear and formal
recognition of the existence of a number of factors or barriers which
preclude many individuals from taking effective action to enforce their legal
rights.91 Rendering the PART IVA regime unavailable to a group of
claimants with individually recoverable claims would also run counter to the
judicial economy purpose of class actions.
The Explanatory Memorandum 92 draws attention to the fact that
this power may be exercised where "a separate proceeding [could be]
brought by the representative party whether singly or in conjunction with
one or more other persons as applicants."93 The first part of the quoted
example-concerning the ability of the representative plaintiff to initiate
individual proceedings singly-provokes an obvious question: how does the
ability of the former representative plaintiff to enforce her rights in a
proceeding involving only herself, on the plaintiff's side, benefit the former
class members? The only possible answer to this question is that the
individual proceedings of the former PART IVA plaintiff may benefit the
former class members by being treated as a "test case." The ALRC has
explained that the term "test case" is sometimes used to describe
proceedings "brought by a single applicant in circumstances where many
other people may have the same or similar claims. This may be done by the
unilateral action of the claimant., 94 However, a number of significant
problems exist with this device as a mechanism for dealing with mass
claims. Test case litigation, unlike a class proceeding, is not binding on the
claimants who are non-named plaintiffs. 95 Another fundamental problem
90 Duffy revealed that an opt out procedure is preferable because it "ensures that people,
particularly those who are poor or less educated, can obtain redress where they may be unable to take
the positive step of having themselves included in the proceedings": ibid.
9 1
"Many claims are not individually litigated, not because they are lacking in merit or unimportant
to the potential claimant, but because of economic, social, and psychological barriers": OLRC Report,
supra note 5 at 139. See also Cooper, supra note 9 at 218.
9 2 Memo, supra note 74.
93 Ibid. at para. 23.
94 ALRC Report, supra note 9 at 22.
95See MLRC Report, supra note 5 at 11; ALRC Report, supra note 9 at 22-23; Deborah R. Hensler,
"Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation"
(2001) 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 179 at 191; OLRC Report, supra note 5 at 88; Centre for Legal
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with this device was described as follows by the Manitoba Law Reform
Commission:
The plaintiff does not owe any legal obligation to have regard to the impact of their case on
future litigation by others, and the lawyer is bound to obtain the most favourable result for
the client-even if such a result may create a precedent which is not useful, or is potentially
harmful, to other similar litigants. Furthermore, test cases are often settled on terms
favourable to the plaintiff without a resolution of the underlying issues (such as admissions
of liability, amendments of legislation, or changes in government programming) that gave
rise to the litigation in the first place.'
It is apparent that the discontinuance of a class proceeding on the
basis of the availability of the other devices for dealing with group
litigation, that the class action device was intended to replace, would
constitute a strategy devoid of merit or indeed logic.97
The second part of the comment from the Explanatory
Memorandum quoted above, concerning the ability of the former
representative plaintiff to issue separate proceedings in conjunction with
some of the former class members as co-plaintiffs, refers to the joinder
procedure. Order 6 Rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules9' provides for the
joinder of parties where there are common questions of law or fact and
where all rights to relief claimed in the proceedings are "in respect of or
arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions."99 Two or more
parties may also be joined where the court gives leave to do so. The
availability of the joinder device was relied upon by Justice Bongiorno of
the Supreme Court of Victoria, in McLean v. Nicholson,1"' to exercise the
power to terminate class actions provided by section 33N(1)(b) of Part 4A,
a provision that is identical to section 33N(1)(b) of PART IVA." °1
The proceedings in McLean were brought on behalf of a small
Process of the NSW Law Foundation, Proposal for a New Supreme Court Rule on Representative
Proceedings in NSW(Public Interest Advocacy Centre; 1998) at para. 1.3 [NSW Law Foundation]; Kellam
& Clark, supra note 39 at para. 15.14; and J. Donnan, "Class Actions in Securities Fraud in Australia"
(2000) 18 Com. & Sec. L. J. 82 at 85.
96MLRC Reportsupra note 5 at 10. See also, Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newbergon Class
Actions, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson West, 2002) vol. 2 at 253.
9 7 See Chace v. Crane Canada Inc. (1996), 5 C.P.C. (4th) 292 at 298-99, Mackenzie J.; and (1997),
14 C.P.C. (4th) 197 at 205-06, Cumming, Newbury & Huddart J.A.
98 Federal Court Rules (Aus).
99 Ibid., o.6 r. 2.
100 [2002] V.S.C. 446 [McLean].
101 See also supra note 85 at 456, Hill J.; and Dinning v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999),
99 A.T.C. 4621 at 4628, Ryan J.
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group of claimants. The group's size was one of the major factors that led
Justice Bongiorno to conclude that the employment of the joinder device
constituted a more appropriate means of dealing with the dispute than the
continuance of a Part 4A proceeding.10 2 Unfortunately, no consideration
was given by the court as to whether the claims of the group members were
individually recoverable. The Supreme Court also failed to refer to a
number of advantages that are offered to class members by a class
proceeding, which would not be available if they were joined as co-plaintiffs
under the joinder procedure. As non-parties,'0 3 class members are generally
not liable for costs" and are also able to avoid most of the other burdens
associated with litigation. 10 5 This confers upon class members a privileged
status not enjoyed by the representative parties and the class opponent.10 6
This should be contrasted with the joinder device where all of the
obligations of the ordinary rules of procedure apply to each of the joined
plaintiffs as they are parties in the strict sense. Some obvious obligations
are that each of the parties must exchange pleadings with each defendant
and must submit to discovery and interrogatories. 0 7 Each named plaintiff
may request the same of the defendant and to be given notice of, and
participate in, any interlocutory steps. This means that, as highlighted by
the Manitoba Law Reform Commission, the use of the joinder device "can
result in cumbersome and expensive proceedings-precisely what class
proceedings legislation is designed to avoid."'' 0 8 Furthermore, those in a
1 02 Supra note 100 at paras. 12-13.
103 See Johnson Tiles Ply Ltd. v. EssoAustralia Ltd. (1999), 166 A.L.R. 731 at 738, Merkel J.; and
Mobil Oil, supra note 76 at 175, Gaudron, Gummow & Hayne JJ.
104 Supra note 8, s. 43(1A). See also Ontario Act, supra note 6, s. 31(2); Quebec Code, supra note
6, art. 1006(0; BcAct,supra note 6, s. 37(4); Saskatchewan Act, supra note 6, s. 40(4); NewfoundlandAct,
supra note 6, s. 37(4); Manitoba Act, supra note 6, s. 37(4); Federal Court Rules, supra note 6, Rule
299.41; Part 4A, Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s. 33ZD; and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts 472 U.S.
797 at 810 (1995).
105 SeeAmerican Pipe & Construction Co v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 at 552 (1974); Van Gemert v. Boeing
Co., 590 F.2d 433 at 440 (2nd Cir. 1978); Resnick v. American Dental Association, 95 F.R.D. 372, 379
(N.D. I11. 1982); Richard H. Dreyfuss, "Class Action Judgment Enforcement in Italy: Procedural 'Due
Process' Requirements" (2002) 10 Tul. J. Int'l. & Comp. L. 5 at 12-13; LRCI Report, supra note 2 at 62;
and Western Canadian, supra note 6 at 397, McLachlin C.J.C. (S.C.C.).
106 See Neil J. Williams, "Consumer Class Actions in Canada-Some Proposals for Reform"
(1975) 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 at 15; andMobil Oil, supra note 76 at 172, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne
J.J.
107 In Western Canadian, supra note 6 at 407, McLachlin C.J.C., the Supreme Court of Canada
highlighted the fact that "[o]ne of the benefits of a class action is that discovery of the class
representatives will usually suffice and make unnecessary discovery of each individual class member."
108 MLRC Report, supra note 5 at 13. See also NSW Law Foundation, supra nute 95 at para. 1.3.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
continuing relationship with the defendant may fear victimization if they
consent to be named as a plaintiff.'0 9 As a consequence, someone who is
risk averse or litigation shy, receives inadequate information, or is deterred
by psychological factors from coming forward and consenting to act as a
plaintiff may be left with no legal remedy."0
The only interpretation of paragraph (b) that would not undermine
the ability of PART IVA proceedings to fulfill their objectives is that
termination of PART IVA proceedings under this provision is only justified
where the claims of the class may be advanced under comprehensive class
action regimes that may be available in other Australian jurisdictions.'
D. Paragraph (c)
To bring to an end something that is inefficient or ineffective is
obviously a desirable strategy. At first glance, this reasoning would appear
to be particularly persuasive in the context of class actions given that, as
colourfully noted by a Canadian judge, "class actions have the potential for
becoming monsters of complexity and cost."' u 2 But upon closer analysis, a
number of significant problems with paragraph (c) emerge. The application
of the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness necessitates a certain degree
of value judgment, and therefore creates uncertainty. It also extends to
judges who do not look favourably upon class actions an effective means of
restricting the use of the class action device." 3 It is surprising that this
109 See Vince Morabito, "Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out under PART IVA of the Federal
Court ofAustralia Act 1976 (Cth.)" (1994) 19 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 615 at 631.
110 See, generally, M. Tilbury, "The Possibilities for Class Actions in Australian Law" (Paper
presented at the 1993 "Australian Legal Convention," in Hobart) at 6; OLRC Report, supra note 5 at 85-
86; Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472,484 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Lord Woolf, supra note 5 at 225; Justice
S. Charles, "Class Actions in Australia" (Paper presented at the "Australian Bar Association
Conference," San Francisco, 1996) at 30; Donnan, supra note 95 at 85; Kellam & Clark, supra note 39
at paras. 15.11-15.12; Chace (1997) 14 C.P.C. (4th) 197 at 205-06, Cumming, Newbury & Huddart JJ.A.;
and Justice D. Ryan, "The Development of Representative Proceedings in the Federal Court" (1993)
9 Austl. Bar Rev. 131 at 133.
111 This was precisely the approach followed by Justice Emmett in Murphy v. Overton Investments
Pty Ltd., [19991 F.C.A. 1123 at para. 112 [Murphy]. See also Poignand v. NZI Securities Australia Ltd.
(1992), 37 F.C.R. 363; Kinross v. GIOAustralia Holdings Ltd. (1994), 55 F.C.R. 210 at 213, Einfeld J.;
and Bray, supra note 65 at 15-16, Merkel J.
112 Tiemstra v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia (1996), 22 B.C.L.R. (3d) 49 at 61, Esson CJ.
113 There have been instances of proceedings not being allowed to progress under PART IVA and
Part 4A where the decisions in question appear to have been attributable, more to the relevant judge's
general understanding of what types of proceedings should be allowed to be conducted as class
proceedings, than to an application of any actual restrictions found in the provisions of the Federal and
Victorian class action regimes: See, e.g, Philip Morris, supra note 29 at 490, Spender J. and at 523,
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potential problem was overlooked by the drafters of PART IVA. In fact, the
extremely narrow construction of the "same interest" requirement, for the
purposes of the traditional representative action procedure,1 14 was largely
attributable to a certain degree of judicial hostility towards the concept of
named plaintiffs being able to affect the rights of others-the represented
persons-who have no real control over the proceedings in question.
1 15
These criticisms should not be taken as a rejection of the relevance
to class actions of the goals of efficiency and effectiveness. These concepts
should be utilized in selecting the requirements that aspiring class
representatives must fulfill, before being able to have recourse to the PART
IVA regime, and the types of procedures and safeguards that should be in
place to manage a PART IVA proceeding. But these subjective concepts
should not themselves be used as criteria for determining which
proceedings should be allowed to continue as class proceedings. The
discussion in Part II above has shown that the approach that is advocated
here is essentially the approach that was embraced by the ALRC. The two
commencement prerequisites,116 the narrow termination powers, and the
various judicial powers to manage the proceedings that were recommended
by the ALRC, were the result of the ALRC's assessment of what was needed
to ensure that grouped proceedings were efficient and effective, as well as
fair, to all those affected by such proceedings.
In practice, section 33N(1)(c) has resulted in the introduction of a
requirement that is broadly similar to one of the certification criteria found
in Rule 23. Certification of a proceeding as a class action in U.S. Federal
Courts requires compliance with two "steps." First, a class "may sue or be
sued" under Rule 23 if the proposed class satisfies the four threshold
requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity-the class must be so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
commonality-there must be questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) typicality-the claims or defences of the representative parties must be
Sackville J.; McLean, supra note 100 at paras. 7, 10, Bongiorno J. For an illustration of a diametrically
opposed approach, see Zhang de Yong v. Milgea (1993), 118 A.L.R. 165 at 183, French J. [Zhang].
114 See, e.g, Order 6 rule 13 of the Federal Court Rules (Aus.), supra note 98, which provides that
"where numerous persons have the same interest in any proceeding the proceeding may be commenced,
and, unless the Court otherwise orders, continued, by or against any one or more of them as
representing all or as representing all except one or more of them."
115 See, e.g, Markt and Co Ltd v. Knight Steamship Co Ltd, [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 at 1040, Fletcher
Moulton L.J.;Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v. Carie (1992), 29 N.S.W.L.R. 382 at 404, MeagherJ.A.
116 As recently pointed out by Lindgren J., "[tjhere are sufficient procedural safeguards in s.
33C(1)(b) and (c) to protect the integrity of the court's processes": Bray v. FHoffinan-La Roche Ltd.
(2003), 200 A.L.R. 607 at 631.
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typical of the claims or defences of the class; and (4) adequacy of
representation-the representative parties must fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
In addition, plaintiffs must satisfy one of the alternative conditions
found in Rule 23(b). Rule 23(b) creates three different types of class
actions. The one that is of interest for present purposes is the third type,
which deals essentially with class actions where damages are sought. The
requirements for this type of class proceeding are found in Rule 23(b)(3),
which imposes the requirements that the common questions of law or fact
predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members".7
and that the class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 8
The requirement that common issues predominate over non-
common issues has been "a bone of much contention"'1 9 and has severely
restricted the availability of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions." But a broadly
similar requirement appears to exist under PART IVA, given that the Federal
Court has terminated PART IVA proceedings (or indicated that it would be
appropriate to take such a step) pursuant to section 33N(1)(c) (and
sometimes pursuant to section 33N(1)(d)),' 2' on the ground that the need
to examine the individual circumstances of some or many of the class
members would render a PART IVA action an inefficient and ineffective
means of dealing with the claims of the class members. 22
1 1 7 See Civil Rules Advisory Committee, "Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure
for the United States District Courts" (1966), 39 F.R.D. 69 at 103; and John C. Coffee, Jr., "Class
Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation" (2000) 100
Colum. L. Rev. 370 at 400.
118 Conte & Newberg, supra note 96 at 249 have explained that "some courts have denied small
claimant classes for lack of superiority by focusing on manageability difficulties or other superiority
factors."
119 ALRI Report, supra note 2 at 69.
120 See L.J. Harbour, S. Croft & T. Sheehan, "Class Actions: An American Perspective" in
Hodges, supra note 39, 205 at 214-17;Amchem Products Inc v. Windsor 521 U.S. 591 at 623-25 (1997);
Scott S. Partridge & Kerry J. Miller, "Some Practical Considerations for Defending and Settling
Products Liability and Consumer Class Actions" (2000) 74 Tul. L. Rev. 2125 at 2139-40; and Conte &
Newberg, supra note 96 at 233-35.
121 See e.g. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v. Internic Technology Pty Ltd (14
July 1998), Australia No NG 395 of 1998 (Federal Court), Lindgren J.
122 See Schanka v. Employment National (Administration) PtyLtd (1998), 86 I.R. 283 at 294, Moore
J.; Murphy, supra note 110 at paras. 113-14, 121; Murphy v. Overton Investments Py Ltd., [1999] F.C.A.
1673 at paras. 31, 35, Emmett J. [Overton]; Philip Morris, supra note 29 at 493, Hill J. and at 521,
Sackville J.; Vasram, supra note 35 at paras. 7, 14; Vasram v. AMP Life Limited, [2000] FCA 1916 at
para. 21, Stone J. [AMP]; Bright, supra note 87 at 648, 651, Stone J.; Connell v. Nevada Financial Group
(1996), 139 A.L.R. 723 at 733, Drummond J.; and Tsang v. Uvanna (December 1995), Australia No
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This judicial development is grossly unsatisfactory for a number of
reasons. In 1999, the High Court of Australia rejected the view, which had
been formulated by the Full Federal Court, that determining whether a
common issue was substantial, for the purposes of section 33C(1)(c),
required a comparison of the significance of the common issues with that
of the uncommon issues to the determination of the claims of the class
members.123 Some of the reasons that prompted a judicial rejection of the
need to consider the proportionality involved between the common issues
and the non-common issues, in relation to section 33C(1)(c), were
explained by Justice Wilcox of the Federal Court: "It is difficult to see why
it is necessary, or legitimate, to compare the substantiality of a common
issue with the substantiality of any non-common issues ... to take this course
is to encourage respondents to raise artificial non-common issues.,, 24
The problems identified by Justice Wilcox are not removed or
diminished merely because the flawed judicial approach in question is
considered in the context of section 33N and not with respect to section
33C(1). 125 The judicial addition of a requirement that bears some similarity
to the United States predominance of common questions condition may
also be said to be inconsistent with the intention of the drafters of PART
IVA. The report of the ALRC contained an extensive discussion and analysis
of Rule 23. Accordingly, it appears reasonable to act on the premise that
the drafters of PART IVA were aware of the U.S. predominance of the
common issues requirement. The fact that no similar provision appears in
PART IVA logically points to a desire not to impose a similar requirement
on Australian class representatives. The inappropriateness of a judicial
approach that regards as relevant to section 33N an assessment of the
impact that the common issues will have on the overall progress and
outcome of the proceedings may also be demonstrated by considering the
practical focus of class action regimes, the purposes of PART IVA, and the
general scheme of PART IVA.
NG505 of 1994 (Federal Court), Lockhart J.
123 Supra note 29.
124 Justice M. Wilcox, "Representative Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia: A Progress
Report" (1996-97) 15 Austl. Bar Rev. 91 at 93.
125 One difference between these two provisions should, however, be noted. If there is a failure
to comply with one of the requirements found in s. 33C(1), the court has no power to allow the litigation
to proceed under PART IVA. On the other hand, the power under s. 33N is discretionary: Huang, supra
note 79 at 137, Lehane J.; Vasram, supra note 35 at para. 9, Stone J.
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1. Practical Focus of Class Action Devices
Justice Gillard of the Supreme Court of Victoria has recently
explained that:
[I]t is important that the Court conducts group proceeding litigation in a practical manner
and ensures that as many questions of law and fact that have a degree of commonality are
decided .... [A] group proceeding is not concerned with the complete cause of action of a
claimant, in the sense that all elements of the cause of action and issues raised are
determined in the proceeding. The Court considers and determines the common questions
of law and fact.1'2
Once this feature of class proceedings is acknowledged, it is
irrational to view the efficiency and effectiveness of a class proceeding from
the perspective of arriving at a final judicial determination with respect to
the claims of each of the class members. A more realistic and sensible
approach is to require a class proceeding to be an efficient and effective
way of resolving the common issues of law or fact. This is the approach that
is followed by seven of the eight Canadian jurisdictions that have class
action regimes. In fact, as noted in Part III, in these jurisdictions the fourth
certification prerequisite is that a class proceeding be the preferable
procedure for the resolution of the common issues.127 Six of these Canadian
class action regimes expressly indicate that the third certification
prerequisite-that the claims of the class members raise common
issues-may be satisfied whether or not those common issues predominate
over issues affecting only individual members.2 8 This directive to the courts
managing class proceedings was prompted by one of the first judicial
pronouncement in Ontario on the common issues requirement. InAbdool
126 Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v. Esso Australia Ply Ltd., [2003] V.S.C. 27 at para. 42, Gillard J. [Esso].
See also Wilcox, supra note 124 at 93; OLRC Report, supra note 5 at 305; McLean, supra note 100 at para.
5, Bongiorno J.; and Campbell v. Flexwatt Corp. (1997), 44 B.C.L.R. (3d) 343 at 359, Cumming, Newbury
& Huddart JJ.A [Campbell].
127 "It is to be noted that a class proceeding does not have to be the preferable procedure for
resolving the whole controversy, but merely the preferable procedure for resolving the common issues":
Campbell, supra note 126 at 362, Cumming, Newbury & Huddart JJ.A. Four of these regimes have
added the words "fair and efficient" resolution of the common issues: see B.C. Act, supra note 6, s.
4(1)(d); Manitoba Act, supra note 6, s. 4(d); Federal Court Rules, supra note 6, Rule 299.18(1)(d); and
Alberta Act, supra note 6, s. 5(1)(d).
128 See B.C. Act, supra note 6, s. 4(1)(c); Saskatchewan Act, supra note 6, s. 6(c); Newfoundland
Act, supra note 6, s. 5(1)(c); Manitoba Act, supra note 6, s. 4(c); Federal Court Rules, supra note 6, Rule
299.18(1)(c); and Alberta Act, supra note 6, s. 5(1)(c).
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v. Anaheim Management Ltd., 12 9 Justice Montgomery of the Ontario Court
(General Division) declined to certify a class action because the individual
issues predominated over the issues common to the proposed class. 3°
But, curiously, in four of the Canadian class action regimes that
contain the directive that common issues need not predominate over
individual issues, courts are still required to compare common issues with
non-common issues. In fact, in applying the fourth certification
requirement-of whether the class proceeding would be the preferable
procedure for the resolution of the common issues-they are required to
consider five factors, one of which is whether the common issues
predominate over the individual issues.131 This approach-pursuant to
which the significance of the common issues vis-A-vis the non-common
issues is not, contrary to Rule 23, a mandatory certification requirement but
is instead one of the factors to be considered in applying the preferable
procedure requirement-can be attributed to a recommendation made by
the Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC) in 1982.32 This
recommendation was not adopted by the Ontario Attorney-General's
Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform133 in 1990 and by the Ontario
legislature in 1992 when it enacted the Class Proceedings Act.134 But, as
indicated above, the approach recommended by the OLRC was embraced
by four other Canadian jurisdictions, namely, British Columbia,
Newfoundland, Alberta, and the Federal Court. The implementation of the
OLRC's recommendation has meant that the class action regimes in these
129 (1993), 15 O.R. (3d) 39.
130 See Rogers, supra note 4 at 8; and Garry D. Watson, "Initial Interpretations of Ontario's Class
Proceedings Act: The Anaheim and the Breast Implant Actions" (1993) 18 C.P.C. (3d) 344.
131 B.C. Act, supra note 6, s. 4(2); Newfoundland Act, supra note 6, s. 5(2); Federal Court Rules,
supra note 6, Rule 299.18(2); and Alberta Act, supra note 6, s. 5(2). The other four criteria are whether
a significant number of the members of the class have a valid interest in individually controlling the
prosecution of separate actions, whether the class proceedingwould involve claims that are or have been
the subject of any other proceedings, whether other means of resolving the claims are less practical or
less efficient, and whether the administration of the proceeding would create greater difficulties than
those likely to be experienced if relief were sought by other means.
132OLRC Report, supra note 5 at 407-08. See also W. A. Bogart, "Ouestioning Litigation's
Role-Courts and Class Actions in Canada" (1987) 62 Ind. L. J. 665 at 692-93. Under the 1976 Uniform
ClassActionsAct (see supra note 3), this factor is but one "of at least of thirteen criteria which the court
is to consider before determining whether the class action should be permitted 'for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy"': Scher, supra note 3 at 75.
133 Ontario Committee Report, supra note 5 at 30. It was also rejected by the Alberta Law Reform
Institute on the basis that it "might invite a predominance debate of the sort that has been problematic
in the United States": ALRI Report, supra note 2 at 73.
134 [Ontario Act], supra note 6.
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four jurisdictions are more restrictive than the other Canadian regimes that
do not expressly direct the courts to consider the significance of the
common issues.
1 35
The adverse impact on the availability of the class action procedure
that is caused by an approach that requires courts to compare the
significance of common issues, to the resolution of the controversy, with the
significance of non-common issues is also highlighted by recent judicial
developments concerning the preferable procedure requirement under the
Ontario Act. As indicated above, the Ontario legislature did not include a
requirement that courts consider whether questions of fact or law common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members in determining whether the class action device would
be the preferable procedure for the resolution of the common issues.
Indeed, the Ontario Act does not spell out any factors that are to be
considered by the Court in applying the preferable procedure requirement.
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada held that Ontario courts, when
applying the preferable procedure requirement, must consider the
significance of common issues to the resolution of the claims pursued by the
class, despite the lack of any such requirement in the Ontario Act. 136 This
judicial development has been directly responsible for a drastic increase in
the number of certifications that have been denied by Ontario courts.137
2. The Judicial Economy Goal of Class Actions
Terminating a class proceeding because individual issues are more
significant than issues that are common to the claims of all the class
members generates results that are inconsistent with the judicial economy
aim of class actions.138 In Bright v. Femcare Limited, Justice Lindgren
135 See supra note 112 at 58, Esson C.J.; ALRI Report, supra note 2 at 70-71; and LRCI Report,
supra note 2 at 70.
The Court unpersuasively rejected the relevance of the lack of express reference to this
requirement in the Ontario Act on the basis that it cannot be concluded "that the drafters intended the
preferability analysis to take place in a vacuum. There must be a consideration of the common issues
in context": supra note 69 at 36, McLachlin C.J.C. Ironically, at the same time the Court urged Ontario
courts not to "take an overly restrictive approach to the legislation, but rather interpret the Act in a way
that gives full effect to the benefits foreseen by the drafters" (ibid. at 29).
137 See Garry D. Watson, "Annual Survey of Recent Developments on Civil Procedure" in Garry
D. Watson and M. McGowan, Ontario Civil Practice 2004 (Toronto: Carswell, 2003), ch 4.
138 See Lipp, supra note 39 at 374-76; Halvorson v. British Columbia (Medical Services
Commission), [2003] B.C.D. Civ J LEXIS 524 at 27-28, Donald, Huddart & Mackenzie JJ.A. ("the
Court's interest in avoiding a multiplicity of similar claims also weighs in favour of class proceedings");
and Dalhuisen (Guardian ad Litem) v. Maxim's Bakery Ltd., [2002] B.C.D. Civ. J. 731 at para. 19,
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illustrated this proposition as follows:
But let it be assumed that in respect of the resolution of each [class member's] claim, two-
thirds of the time to be spent will have to be devoted to issues unique to that claim and one-
third to issues which are common to all claims. Is it still not preferable that the common
issues be heard and determined once so as to be binding as between each claimant and the
respondents rather than many times?'39
It is therefore disappointing that in several cases where an order
was issued under section 33N(1)(c), the court based its ruling partly on the
finding that having the former class members issue individual proceedings,
which could be heard by the same court, was a more efficient means of
dealing with the legal dispute in question than the continuance of a PART
IVA proceeding." This was the approach followed by Justice Stone, the
trial judge in Bright.t41 One of the factors that persuaded Justice Stone to
discontinue a PART IVA proceeding, pursuant to section 33N(1)(a) and (c),
was that the techniques of case management in individual actions could
reduce the cost of individual claims by, for instance, having the same judge
deal with all the individual claims.
142
The Full Federal Court set aside Justice Stone's order. Two
members of the Full Court, Justices Lindgren and Finkelstein, specifically
dealt with this aspect of Justice Stone's judgment. They both pointed out
that the scenario envisaged by Justice Stone, of the same judge hearing all
the individual claims, would only be possible if the proceedings were all
commenced in the same state. In the view of Justices Lindgren and
Finkelstein, it could not be safely assumed that this would, in fact, occur.143
Justice Finkelstein added that what Justice Stone had in mind was:
[A] situation where there would be orders to consolidate separate claims or have them heard
either concurrently or sequentially before the same judge. One possible consequence of this
approach is that the contemplated procedure will in substance bring into existence what is
in effect, but not in name, a representative proceeding, which is what we already have.... In
any event ... the possibility of apprehended bias by prejudgment may be a legal barrier that
Burnyeat J. ("judicial economy is not served by 48 separate actions").
139 Bright, supra note 40 at 589. See also Batten v. CTMS Ltd., [2001] F.C.A. 1493 at para. 12,
Kiefel J., where attention is drawn to the fact that "a proceeding which reduces a substantial amount
of evidence which would need to be tendered and considered in a large number of cases would come
within" the judicial economy objective of PART IVA.
140 See e.g. Overton, supra note 122 at para. 42, Emmett J.; andAMP, supra note 122 at para. 21,
Stone J.
Supra note 87.
142 Ibid. at 651.
143 Bright, supra note 40 at 588-89, Lindgren J., and at 606-07, Finkelstein J.
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would prevent one judge from hearing related claims.'
Even if one accepted that having numerous individual proceedings
before the same judge constituted, in some cases, a more efficient and
effective option than having one class proceeding, attainment of this
allegedly desirable scenario is only possible if the former class members are
both able and willing to initiate individual proceedings. Where this is not
the case, an order to terminate a PART IVA proceeding will undermine the
ability of the PART IVA regime to secure its access to justice rationale.145
The tension between section 33N and the access to justice goal of PART IVA
is fully explored below, in the analysis of paragraph (d).
3. The General Scheme of PART IVA
A judicial approach that views the need to assess the individual
circumstances of some or many of the class members as something that is
prima facie undesirable, 146 and which might thus justify the discontinuance
of a class proceeding, is also difficult to reconcile with the general scheme
of PART IVA. 147 In Part II, above, it was noted that section 33C(2) provides
a clear directive to the court that access to PART IVA is not to be denied
simply because the proposed class proceeding includes claims that would
require individual assessment. This fact has been recognized by the Full
Federal Court as it has noted that the purpose of this provision "is to make
clear that it is not a legitimate objection to a [PART IVA] proceeding that it
involves particular claims for relief or disparate issues.'
148
Furthermore, PART IVA arms the court with extensive powers to
deal with non-common issues raised by the claims of some or most of the
class members.149 Section 33Q(1), for instance, empowers the court to give
144 Ibid. at 607.
145 Conte & Newberg, supra note 96 at 251: "When the claims of class members are small, denial
of a class action would effectively exclude them from judicial redress."
146 QuantasAirways Lid v. Cameron (1996), 66 F.L.R. 246 at 298, Lehane J.
147As noted by Einfeld J. in Marks, supra note 59 at 311: "PART IVA anticipates that individuals
in the group will have differing circumstances."
148 Finance Sector Union ofAustralia v. Commonwealth Bank ofAustralia (1999), 166 A.L.R. 141
at 147, Wilcox, Ryan & Madgwick JJ. [Finance Sector]. See also Ryan, supra note 110 at 137: "The added
flexibility inherent in s. 33C(2) is most desirable and conforms with the general policy ... of promoting
the efficient use of court resources and minimising the cost of litigation to the parties."
149 See Wong, supra note 29 at 334, Foster J.; Community & Public Sector Union v. Victoria, [1999]
F.C.A. 743 at para. 23, Marshall J. [Community]; Finance Sector, supra note 148 at 145, Wilcox, Ryan
& Madgwick JJ.; and Dagi, supra note 76 at para. 46, Hedigan J. Similar provisions appear in Part 4A:
Mobil Oil, supra note 76 at 164, Gleeson C.J. and at 199, Kirby J.
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directions in relation to the determination of issues which have been left
unresolved by the determination of the common issues. 150 Section 33Q(2)
allows the court to establish sub-groups so as to deal with issues common
to the claims of only some of the group members. The power to create sub-
groups is an effective judicial tool for protecting the interests of both class
members 5' and defendants. 5 2
Section 33R(1) allows an individual group member to appear in the
class proceeding for the purpose of determining an issue that relates to the
claims of that member only. 153 Section 33S comes into play where an issue
cannot properly or conveniently be dealt with under section 33Q or section
33R. Section 33S(a) provides that if the issue concerns the claim of a
particular member only, the court may give directions relating to the
commencement and conduct of a separate proceeding by that member;
while section 33S(b) provides that if the issue in question is common to the
claims of all members of a sub-group, the court may give directions relating
to the commencement and conduct of a representative proceeding in
relation to the claims of those members.
In light of the analysis above, it is pleasing to note that some
Federal Court justices have rejected propositions advanced by defendants
that the need for evidence to be given of the individual circumstances of
class members justified a section 33N order.'54 In some circumstances, this
approach was based, to some extent, on the procedural safeguards found
in PART IVA to ensure that class actions are not misused.'55 The Full
Federal Court's decision in Bright, referred to above, is also encouraging to
the extent that it reminds trial judges that the crucial issue of whether a
proceeding should be discontinued as a PART IVA proceeding must be
governed by the criterion, found in section 33N itself, of what is "in the
interests of justice." This aspect of Bright is considered in the analysis of
150 As explained by French J. in Zhan& supra note 113 at 185, s. 33Q "contemplates the hiving off
of individual claims when the common determination does not finally determine the claims of all group
members."
151See Nixon v. Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd. (1999), 165 A.L.R. 515 at 546, Wilcox J.; Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 at 179, n. 16 (1974); and Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 at
1349-50 (9th Cir. 1980).
152 LRCI Report, supra note 2 at 74.
153In Wong, supra note 29 at 380, Gleeson C.J., McHugh, Gummow, Kirby & Callinan JJ., the
High Court referred to s. 33R as an example of the safeguards found in PART IVA.
154See e.g. Marks, supra note 59 at 311-15 and the cases cited therein; Johnson Tiles Ply Ltd. v.
EssoAustralia Pty Ltd., [1999] F.C.A. 636 at para. 20, Black C.J., North & Finkelstein JJ. [Johnson]; and
Community, supra note 149 at paras. 24-26, Marshall J.
155 See e.g. Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd. v. Esso Australia Pty Ltd. [1999] F.C.A. 56 at para. 62,Merkel J.
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paragraph (d).
E. Paragraph (d)
As noted by Justice Lindgren in Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission v. Giraffe World Australia Pty Ltd, "[t]he words
'otherwise inappropriate' are words of wide import. 156 At the same time,
"the legislature has not given much assistance as to the criteria for
determining the appropriateness or inappropriateness of pursuing claims
by means of a representative procedure."'157 It is, therefore, not surprising
that there has been some confusion on the part of the Federal Court as to
when this power is to be exercised.'58
The drafting of section 33N(1)(d) was clearly influenced by the
power found in Order 6 rule 13 of the Federal Court Rules to terminate
representative proceedings which have adhered to the "same interest"
requirement. This power is found in the words "the proceeding may be
commenced, and, unless the Court otherwise orders, continued."'59 In
drafting a termination power for a new t6° and controversial device, such as
the class action device, it is understandable that the drafters of PART IVA
sought to emulate a procedure that has been available for more than 100
years.16' But, unfortunately, they failed to appreciate the great uncertainty
that has surrounded the ambit of this termination power. 62
156 Supra note 66 at 290. See also Vince Morabito & J. Epstein, Class Actions in Victoria-Time
fora NewApproach (Report commissioned by the Victorian Attorney-General's Law Reform Advisory
Council; 1997) at para. 6.19; Freeman, supra note 39 at 111; Ryan, supra note 110 at 137; and Lipp,
supra note 39 at 376.
157 Overton, supra note 122 at para. 115, Emmett J.
158 See e.g. Giraffe World Australia Pty Ltd. v. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission,
[1998] F.C.A. 1560 where a s. 33N(1)(d) order was justified on the ground that there had been non-
compliance with s. 33C(1).
159 Federal Court Rules (Aus), supra note 98, o. 6 r. 13(1) [emphasis added].
160 See Tilbury, supra note 110; McMullin v. ICIAustralia Operations Pty Ltd. (1998), 156 A.L.R.
257 at 260, Wilcox J.: "In enacting Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act, Parliament was
introducing into Australian law an entirely novel procedure." However, Ryan J. of the Federal Court
has expressed the view that "in many ways [PART IVA] involves a less radical reform than that
recommended" by the ALRC: Ryan, supra note 110 at 135. See also Mobil Oil supra note 76 at 164,
Gleeson C.J.
161 Mobil Oil, supra note 76 at 175, Gaudron, Gummow & Hayne JJ. and at 205, Callinan J.
162 See R. York, "All Together Now: Standard Term Contracts and Representative Actions"
(1996) 10 J. Contr. L. 85 at 88; Vince Morabito, "Taxpayers and Class Actions" (1997) 20 U.N.S W.L.J.
372 at 403-04; NSW Law Foundation, supra note 95 at para. 4.3.5; and David Kell, "Renewed Life for
the Representative Action" (1995) 13 Austl. Bar Rev. 95 at 97-98.
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The inherent subjectivity and ambiguity of the concept of
"inappropriateness," upon which the power contained in paragraph (d)
depends, represents a significant threat to the attainment of the access to
justice objective of PART IVA. To avoid this undesirable scenario, the power
to terminate properly commenced PART IVA proceedings must be
interpreted and applied by reference to the objects of PART IVA.1 63 This
means that where the class members would be unable to seek legal redress
on their own, the discontinuance of a properly instituted class proceeding
is not justified. 6' An illustration of this desirable approach is furnished by
Huang v. Minister for Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs65 where Justice
Lehane rejected the defendant's application to have this PART IVA
proceeding terminated pursuant to section 33N. This ruling was based on
the fact that the class members would have been time-barred from
commencing individual proceedings. The relevance, to the exercise of the
section 33N power, of the inability of the class members in question to
initiate individual proceedings, should not be limited to circumstances
where this inability is attributable to legal obstacles such as the operation
of statutory limitation periods. It should also extend to circumstances where
an inability to pursue legal remedies, through traditional proceedings, is
attributable to financial" 66 and non-financial barriers.
167
163 See Ryan, supra note 110 at 142. Canadian courts are frequently guided by the policy goals of
class actions when interpreting class action legislation: Garry D. Watson, "Class Actions: The Canadian
Experience" (2001) 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 269 at 271. This is particularly evident in the
application of the preferable procedure certification requirement: ALRI Report, supra note 2 at 69-70.
This judicial approach was recently endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hollick, supra note
69 at 34, McLachlin C.J.C.
164 See Lipp, supra note 39 at 376-77; OLRC Report, supra note 5 at 345; Halvorson, supra note 138
at 27-28, Donald, Huddart and Mackenzie JJ.A.; Dalhuisen, supra note 138 at para. 21, Burnyeat J.;
Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Society (1997), 36 B.C.L.R. (3d) 350 at para. 63, Smith J.; and Harrington
v. Dow Coming Corp. (1996), 22 B.C.L.R. (3d) 97 at 113, Mackenzie J.
16 5 Huang, supra note 79 at 139, Lehane J.
166 As noted by Lindgren J., "the policy of PART IVA is that respondents should not benefit from
the fact that individual claims are relatively small and that many group members might not consider it
worth their while to litigate them on their own initiative": Ryan v. Great Lakes Council (1998), 155
A.L.R.447 at 456; and Giraffe World, supra note 66 at 293. See also Williams v. FAI Home Security Pty
Ltd. (No 4), [2000] F.C.A. 1925 at para. 39, Goldberg J.; Graham Barclay Oysters Ply Ltd. v. Ryan (No
2), [2000] F.C.A. 1220 at para. 6, Lee, Lindgren & Kiefel JJ.; Patrick v. Capital Finance Corporation
(Australasia) Ply Ltd., [2001] F.C.A. 1073 at para. 11, Heerey J.; OLRC Report, supra note 5 at 345; and
Conte & Newberg, supra note 96 at 247.
167See 1176560 Ontario Ltd. v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Co of Canada Ltd., 2002 Ont Sup CJ
LEXIS 2263 at 34, Winkler J.; ALRI Report, supra note 2 at 47-48; MLRC Report, supra note 5 at 1-2;
Note, "Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation: IV. Class Action Reform: An
Assessment of Recent Judicial Decisions and Legislative Initiatives" (1999-00) 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1752
at 1809; and Esso, supra note 126 at para. 41, Gillard J.
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Unfortunately, PART IVA proceedings have been terminated by trial
judges with little or no consideration being given to whether this decision
would have the practical effect of preventing access to the court for some
or most of the class members. A striking illustration of this unsatisfactory
judicial stance is provided by Murphy v. Overton Investments Ply Ltd. 168 The
class representative in this PART IVA proceeding sought to persuade the
court not to accede to the defendant's request for a section 33N order by
drawing attention to the fact that most of the class members were residents
of a retirement village. Accordingly, it was reasonable to presume that
most, or at least some, of them might not be able to assume the burdens
associated with being a named plaintiff in a court proceeding. Justice
Emmett dismissed this proposition in the following manner:
That is not a weighty consideration to be taken into account in determining the
inappropriateness or otherwise of the claims being pursued by means of representative
proceedings. Procedures are available, for example, whereby guardians ad litem can be
appointed for incapacitated or disabled parties.169
A different and preferable approach was followed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Rumley v. British Columbia.7 0 The Court upheld a
certification order, partly on the basis of the following considerations:
[I]t is necessary to emphasise the particular vulnerability of the plaintiffs in this case. The
individual class members are deaf or blind or both. Litigation is always a difficult process but
I am convinced that it will be extraordinarily so for the class members here. Allowing the suit
to proceed as a class action may go some way toward mitigating the difficulties that will be
faced by the class members.'
A similar approach was embraced by the Full Federal Court in
Bright. Justice Finkelstein, for instance, drew attention to the fact that
section 33N itself provides that the power it confers upon the court may
only be activated "if it is in the interests of justice."'72 He added that
168Murphy, supra note 111.
169 Ibid. at para. 120. It is therefore strange that in 1996, Peter Gordon, who has acted for
representative plaintiffs in numerous PART IVA proceedings, proposed a certification regime pursuant
to which aspiring class representatives would need to satisfy the Court that, among other things, "there
is no other reason why a class action is inappropriate": P. Gordon, "Class Actions: The Victorian
Direction-The Plaintiffs Perspective" (Paper presented at a Seminar on Class Actions, Melbourne,
June 1996) at 5.
170 (2001), 205 D.L.R. (4th) 39.
171 Ibid. at 57, McLachlin C.J.C.
172 Bright, supra note 40 at 605; see also Bright, supra note 40 at 588-89, Lindgren J., and 601,
Kiefel J.; and Esso, supra note 126 at para. 41, Gillard J. ("the guiding principle of Part 4A, is justice").
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"whether or not it is in the interests of justice to make [a section 33N] order
has to be weighed against the public interest in the administration of justice
that favours class actions. That requires one to consider the principal
objects of the class action procedure.' 7 3 The application of this general
principle to the proceedings in Bright produced the following result:
It seems to me that if these women are not permitted to bring a group claim, it is likely that
many of them will not pursue an individual claim because the potential gain would not justify
incurring the risk of costs. In that sense it would be contrary to the interests of justice to
make an order under s. 33N.'74
V. CONCLUSION
What lessons may be learned from the way in which the
certification-free class action regime in the Federal Court of Australia has
operated over the last twelve years or so? One important lesson is that it
would be naive to act on the premise that the non-employment of a
certification mechanism will ensure that little or no time will be spent by
the court on assessing whether it is appropriate for a given proceeding to
be conducted as a class proceeding. It has also been shown that the lack of
a certification regime does not necessarily mean that representative
plaintiffs are never required to justify, to the Court, their selection of the
class action device as the most appropriate means of dealing with the legal
grievances of the relevant class of plaintiffs. But the existence of very broad
powers to terminate properly commenced class actions makes it difficult to
rely on the problems that have been highlighted in this article as clear and
unambiguous evidence that the certification procedure should be regarded
as an indispensable feature of any modem class action regime.
The experience with PART IVA is also instructive to the extent that
it shows that requiring class representatives to overcome two potential
obstacles before they may be able to conduct a class proceeding produces
outcomes that are incompatible with the "access to justice" and "judicial
economy" objectives of class action devices. The two requirements in
question are, of course, the ability to satisfy the court, in the event of a
challenge by the defendants, that the litigation in question adheres to the
requirements for the commencement of class actions, and that the scenarios
that permit the court to discontinue properly commenced class actions are
not applicable. Therefore, the claim by some commentators that PART IVA
is significantly more pro-plaintiff than class action regimes that employ a
1 73 Bright, supra note 40 at 605. See also, Bright, supra note 40 at 576, Lindgren J.
174 Ibid. at 607.
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certification procedure"' is erroneous.
This study of the Australian federal regime demonstrates that the
commencement criteria constitute the most appropriate mechanism for
determining which proceedings should be conducted as class proceedings.
Consequently, the drafters of the regimes that currently govern class actions
in the United States and Canada may be said to have adopted the correct
approach by providing that, once proceedings are certified as class actions,
they may only be terminated following a re-assessment of whether there has
been compliance with the certification criteria. The operation of the PART
IVA regime has also highlighted the validity of the ALRC's recommendation
that the commencement prerequisites should play a central role in ensuring
that group litigation enhances access to justice for classes of persons with
similar legal grievances, while at the same time operating in a fair and
efficient manner.
Another principle that emerges is that the availability of the class
action device should not be made dependent on vague and subjective
concepts such as efficiency and effectiveness or on the court's unfettered
discretion as to whether it is appropriate for a proceeding to be conducted
as a class proceeding. It has also been shown that the availability of the
class action device is significantly restricted when the court's assessment of
which proceedings should be conducted as class actions is not guided by, or
undertaken by reference to, the benefits that the class action device is
expected to secure.
The analysis of PART IVA also highlights the fact that neither the
lack of a certification regime nor the desirable goals of protecting the
processes of the court and the interests of class members and defendants
justifies the creation of broad termination powers. A final principle that
emerges from this study of PART IVA is that, whether or not a certification
procedure is utilized, the same strategy should be adopted to ensure that
the class action device fullfills its objectives and operates in a fair and
efficient manner. This strategy, which was largely adhered to by the ALRC,
seeks the attainment of the desirable scenario depicted in the preceding
sentence through the selection of appropriate threshold criteria, the
implementation of various safeguards and the conferral on the court of
wide powers to manage the proceedings.
It is highly likely, indeed certain, that the current Australian
government would not. even consider amendments to PART IVA, including
the repeal of provisions such as subsections 33M and 33N, that are likely to
result in an increase in the number of proceedings that may be brought
175 Clark & Harris, supra note 37 at 296-97; and LRCI Report, supra note 2 at 75-76.
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pursuant to PART IVA. Two recent developments substantiate this
conclusion. Firstly, the Australian government has failed to implement the
ALRC's recommendation that a review be commissioned on the operation
of PART IVA. 1 6 Second, it recently legislated to prohibit the use of the PART
IVA regime in migration litigation. 77 In light of this sad reality, the
attainment of the access to justice and judicial economy goals of PART IVA
mandates an extremely narrow construction of the provisions regulating the
judicial discontinuance of properly instituted class actions. The recent
decision of the Full Federal Court in Bright constitutes a step in this
direction.
176 Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice-A Review of the Federal Civil Justice
System (Report no. 89; 2000), recommendation 81.
177 See S. Harris, "Another Salvo Across the Bow: Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No
2) 2000 (Cth.)" (2000) 23 U.N.S.W.L.J. 208.
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